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Abstract
There has been growing interest in increasing the amount of radio spectrum avail-
able for unlicensed broadband wireless access. That includes “prime” spectrum at
lower frequencies, which is also suitable for wide area coverage by licensed cellular
providers. While additional unlicensed spectrum would allow for market expansion,
it could influence competition among providers and increase congestion (interference)
among consumers of wireless services. We study the value (social welfare and consumer
surplus) obtained by adding unlicensed spectrum to an existing allocation of licensed
spectrum among incumbent service providers. We assume a population of customers
who choose a provider based on the minimum delivered price, given by the weighted
sum of the price of the service and a congestion cost, which depends on the number of
subscribers in a band. We consider models in which this weighting is uniform across the
customer population and where the weighting is either high or low, reflecting different
sensitivities to latency. For the models considered, we find that the social welfare de-
pends on the amount of additional unlicensed spectrum, and can actually decrease over
a significant range of unlicensed bandwidths. Furthermore, with nonuniform weighting,
introducing unlicensed spectrum can also reduce consumer welfare.
1 Introduction
The increase in demand for mobile data, driven in part by the proliferation of smart phones
and tablets, is straining the capabilities of current broadband wireless networks. Service
providers have consequently requested increases in the amount of spectrum allocated to com-
mercial broadband services. That has motivated numerous discussions concerning policies
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that would facilitate more efficient use of spectrum PCAST (2012), Peha (2009), Hazlett
and Leo (2010), Berry et al. (2010), Bykowsky et al. (2010). A key policy distinction is
whether such new spectrum is licensed or unlicensed. Licensed spectrum provides the license
holder with exclusive access and is used, for example, to provide cellular services. Unlicensed
spectrum (also referred to as “open access” or “commons” spectrum) can be used by any
device (e.g., for WiFi access) that abides by certain technical restrictions, such as a limit on
transmit power.
The unlicensed bands currently used by WiFi devices are at relatively high frequencies
(i.e., 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz) and operate with low power restrictions, which limits their range
to relatively short distances compared to the wide-area coverage of cellular services. There
has been recent interest in allocating additional unlicensed spectrum at lower frequencies,
in particular, the unused channels, or “white spaces” that lie within spectrum allocated to
broadcast television.1 Because radio signals tend to propagate further at lower frequencies,
the broadcast television bands are more suitable for wide-area coverage than the current
WiFi bands.2 Allocating these bands for unlicensed access would lower the barriers faced
by new entrants seeking to provide wireless data services. This is in contrast to licensed
spectrum for cellular service, which must be purchased by auction or by negotiations with
another Service Provider (SP), posing a steep barrier to entry.3
Adding new entrants to the market increases competition, leading proponents for unli-
censed spectrum to argue that it will benefit consumers as well as the overall economy (e.g.,
see Milgrom et al. (2011)). However, spectrum is a congestible resource in the sense that
shared use generates externalities due to interference. Hence the Quality of Service (QoS)
for a particular user (measured in terms of throughput and/or latency) generally degrades as
the number of users sharing the spectrum increases.4 The high demand for wide-area access
to wireless data services combined with open access to lower frequency bands could create
excessive congestion in those bands leading to a “tragedy of the commons”. Indeed, this is
one of the main arguments for granting exclusive-use licenses for spectrum.
It is unclear a priori which of the preceding effects will dominate and how this depends
on the amount of unlicensed spectrum and consumer demand. In this paper, we introduce
1In 2010 the United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC) published final rules for unli-
censed use of white spaces (FCC (2010)).
2For example, the IEEE 802.22 standard being developed for white spaces can support distances greater
than 30 km, similar to commercial cellular (IEEE (2013)).
3For example, in 2008 firms paid more that $19 billion in an auction for 1090 licenses within the 700 Mhz
band. The majority of those licenses were purchased by incumbent cellular providers FCC (2008).
4In addition, the network infrastructure, which must carry the wireless traffic, also has a capacity limit,
potentially introducing another source of congestion. Here we are mainly concerned with the effect of
interference on QoS.
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a model to gain insight into such questions. More precisely, we consider a market in which
incumbent SPs compete for a common pool of consumers. Each SP has an existing allocation
of licensed spectrum, and we evaluate the effect of introducing unlicensed spectrum as an
additional resource. Any incumbent SP as well as new entrants may offer service in the
unlicensed band in addition to its licensed band, modeling the fact that this band has a low
barrier to entry. To capture congestion effects, we assume that consumers in a particular
band experience a congestion cost that depends on the total number (or mass) of customers
assigned to that band. All customers in a licensed band are served by the associated SP,
whereas the customers in the unlicensed spectrum may be served by different SPs. Our
goal is to determine how the additional unlicensed spectrum affects both social (total) and
consumer welfare.
Our analysis builds upon the framework for price competition in markets for congestible
resources developed in the operations, economics and transportation literature; see, for ex-
ample Levhari and Luski (1978), Armony and Haviv (2003), Hayrapetyan et al. (2005),
Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2007a), Allon and Federgruen (2007), Xiao et al. (2007), Johari
et al. (2010) and the discussion at the end of this section. In this framework, customers
request service from firms (SPs) based on a delivered price that depends on the price paid
for the service, announced by the firm, and the congestion cost. The firms then set prices
to maximize revenue. In prior work it is generally assumed that each firm only has access
to resources for exclusive use. The unlicensed spectrum in this paper can be viewed as an
additional non-exclusive resource made available to each firm.5
To model customer preferences, we assume that the delivered price of a service is a linear
combination of an SP’s announced price and the congestion cost. We consider the following
two cases: (1) a homogeneous customer population in which all customers weight the conges-
tion cost and announced price in the same way, i.e, all customers see the same delivered price;
and (2) a heterogeneous customer population in which there are two user groups (“high-” and
“low-QoS”) with different price-congestion trade-offs. In the heterogeneous model, adding
unlicensed spectrum could conceivably cause the market to segment, namely, by assigning
users desiring higher (lower) QoS to licensed (unlicensed) spectrum. For that reason adding
the unlicensed spectrum might be expected to increase efficiency. We observe, however, that
congestion causes the social welfare and consumer surplus to exhibit relatively complicated
behavior.
Our main results are summarized as follows:
1.) The social welfare depends on the amount of unlicensed spectrum that is added to the
market. Adding an amount of unlicensed spectrum in a particular range, starting from
5In this sense unlicensed spectrum is a congestible public good, e.g., see Scotchmer (1985).
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zero, can cause the social welfare to decrease.
2.) In the homogeneous model, consumer surplus is a non-decreasing function of the
amount of unlicensed spectrum.
3.) In the heterogeneous model, both SP profit and consumer surplus can decrease.
4.) In the heterogeneous model, the customer surplus can be a complicated, non-monotonic
function of the amount of unlicensed spectrum added. (There can be many break points
between which the customer surplus increases, decreases, or stays the same.)
The first result is perhaps counter-intuitive, and is reminiscent of Braess’s paradox
(Braess (1968)) in transportation networks: adding resources can decrease total system
utility. A key difference here is that this decrease is caused from price setting by the SPs
rather than by the users as in Braess (1968). The explanation for this decrease is that the
incumbent SPs, when faced with new competition from the unlicensed band, may have an
incentive to raise (instead of lower) their prices, depending on the amount of bandwidth.
That facilitates a shift of traffic to the unlicensed band, where the associated interference
externality is then shared with other SPs, and causes the overall welfare to decrease. The
second result implies that with homogeneous customers, any such loss in total welfare con-
sists solely of the loss in the SPs’ profits from serving fewer customers after raising their
prices.
In the homogeneous model, prices change continuously as a function of the amount of
unlicensed spectrum being added. In the heterogeneous model, an SP may have an incentive
to increase its price discontinuously in order to switch from serving both high- and low-QoS
customers to serving a smaller number of high-QoS customers. This shifts more low-QoS
customers to the unlicensed band increasing congestion there. Hence, when this switch
happens, customer surplus decreases along with SP profits. Furthermore, the surplus can
be strictly smaller than with no unlicensed spectrum. This is summarized by the preceding
third and fourth results. Overall, these results suggest that adding new unlicensed spectrum
to existing allocations can affect social and customer welfare in complicated ways, and may
have unexpected effects.
As alluded to previously, the general framework of competition with congestible resources
has been studied in a number of different settings. In the context of service industries,
Levhari and Luski (1978) and Armony and Haviv (2003) consider models of competition
among firms whose customers experience a latency given by a queueing delay. As in our
work, customers select firms based on a linear combination of latency and price, where the
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weights in this combination can be heterogeneous across the customers.6 Other related work
considers models in which firms commit to a given latency and then incur a cost to meet this
commitment based on the number of customers they attract. (See Lederer and Li (1997)
and Allon and Federgruen (2007) for a survey of this area.) Here we do not allow for such
commitments.
Closer to our application is work motivated by communication and transportation net-
works. For example, Engel and Galetovic (1999) considers models in which privately owned
toll roads compete for customers (drivers) who select roads based on the delivered price,
whereas Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2007a,b), Hayrapetyan et al. (2005) are motivated by
communication networks such as the Internet, where different links may be owned by differ-
ent SPs, and again customers select links based on a delivered price. A theme in much of
that work is to characterize the inefficiencies that occur due to oligopolistic competition in
congested markets, compared to the outcome under a benevolent social planner. In contrast,
here we focus on the impact of adding unlicensed spectrum on the outcome of such oligopolis-
tic competition. There have been similar studies of efficiency loss in so-called selfish routing
models without pricing (e.g., Roughgarden and Tardos (2002)), and where prices are set by
a benevolent manager (e.g., Cole et al. (2003)). That class of models has also been extended
to allow for investment on the part of SPs as well as pricing decisions (e.g., Campo-Rembado
and Sundararajan (2004), Johari et al. (2010), Acemoglu et al. (2009), Xiao et al. (2007).
Here we assume that any investment is a sunk cost and focus solely on the pricing behavior
of SPs.
Most of the aforementioned work related to communication networks is motivated by
wire-line networks as opposed to the wireless setting we consider. An exception is Campo-
Rembado and Sundararajan (2004), which considers price and capacity allocation between
two wireless SPs, each with licensed spectrum. Users respond to the sum of a price and a
congestion term that reflects the probability that a user’s service is blocked. Another related
model can be found in Maille´ and Tuffin (2010), which studies price competition between
licensed wireless SPs. Users respond to “perceived prices,” which depend on congestion
as well as an announced price, but the relationship is not linear as in our model. Other
work on competition among wireless SPs focuses on different issues such as the impact of
auction design on competition Cramton et al. (2011), the effect of roaming agreements and
termination charges Laffont and Tirole (2001), Armstrong and Wright (2009), and the impact
of customer switching costs Shi et al. (2006).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces our model, and Sec-
6In Levhari and Luski (1978) each customer’s weight is chosen from a distribution with continuous support,
whereas in Armony and Haviv (2003) there are two customer classes as assumed here.
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tion 3 studies and compares social welfare and consumer surplus within this framework.
Conclusions are given in Section 4, and some proofs and numerical calculations are provided
in the appendix.
2 The Model
We present our heterogeneous model assuming two classes of consumers, each class having
a different sensitivity to delay. The homogeneous model is then presented as a special case.
Service Providers
We assume a set of incumbent SPs, each of which has its own licensed band, and a set
of new entrants, which do not have licensed spectrum and must use the unlicensed band
to offer service. (For tractability our analysis will primarily assume a single incumbent.)
Each SP competes for customers by announcing a price for using its licensed band (if it
is an incumbent) and another price for using the unlicensed band. The SP then serves all
customers who accept their posted price. Suppose an SP i sets price pi for service in its
licensed band, price pwi in the unlicensed band, and serves xi and x
w
i customers in those
bands, respectively. Then i’s revenue is given by pii = pixi + p
w
i x
w
i . (Here w stands for
“white space”.)
There is a congestion externality due to the interference suffered by customers in both the
licensed and unlicensed bands. If SP i’s licensed band serves a mass of customers xi, then
each customer served in this band experiences a congestion cost li(xi), which depends on
the bandwidth and the technology deployed by SP i. The congestion cost in the unlicensed
band, however, depends on the total mass of customers served in that band by all SPs.
Specifically, letting xwi be the mass of customers served by SP i in the unlicensed band, the
congestion cost for customers served in the unlicensed band is g(Xw), where Xw =
∑
i∈N x
w
i .
7
The congestion cost g(Xw) also depends on the bandwidth of the unlicensed band and the
technology, which we assume is the same for all SPs. In this paper we consider the case where
li is fixed and g varies according to the available bandwidth of the unlicensed spectrum (in
a manner to be specified).
Throughout the paper we assume that for a given bandwidth, all congestion costs are
monotonically increasing and convex functions of the load (mass of customers served). A
simple example of such a congestion cost, which we use later, is x
C
where C is the bandwidth.
This makes the congestion cost proportional to the time for each customer to send a fixed
7An implicit assumption here is that all customers require the same amount of service (on average) from
the network, so that congestion only depends on the number of customers in a band and not their individual
demands.
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length file, assuming the bandwidth is equally divided among the active customers, the
number of which is proportional to x. Another example, as in Armony and Haviv (2003),
is to assume the congestion cost is proportional to the average delay in a queue where the
arrival rate is proportional to the mass of customers in the band.
In our model, an incumbent SP offers two distinct services, one in the licensed band
and one in the unlicensed band, with a separate price and congestion cost for each. While
reasonable, there could be other pricing policies offered by an incumbent. For example, it
could offer a single service (with a single price) and then split its customers between the
two bands so that they experience the average latency of the two bands over time. We do
not consider such variations in part to keep the analysis from becoming overly complicated.
Also, if there are multiple entrants using the unlicensed band, then it can be seen from our
analysis that new entrants may congest the unlicensed band so that incumbents would not
want to utilize that band in this way.
Customers
As in much of the prior literature on competition with congestible resources, we consider a
unit mass of infinitesimal customers who choose an SP based on the delivered price, which is
the weighted sum of the price announced by an SP and the congestion cost she experiences
when served by that SP. We consider a simple model for heterogeneous customers in which
there are two different classes of customers, delay sensitive (high Quality of Service) and
delay insensitive (low Quality of Service). The classes are distinguished by how much weight
they place on the congestion cost, when determining their delivered price.8
Specifically, for a customer of type t ∈ {h, l} (high, low) served by SP i, the delivered price
in the licensed band is pi+λtli(xi), where λt is the relative weight, and λh > λl. The delivered
price in the unlicensed band is pwi +λtg(X
w). Customers within each class (high/low) choose
the SP and type of service (licensed or unlicensed) with the lowest delivered price. When
facing the same delivered price from multiple SPs, customers randomly choose one of the
SPs.
The demand for services from the two classes is given by two downward sloping demand
functions Dh(p) and Dl(p) with inverse functions Ph(q) and Pl(q), respectively.
9 As is stan-
dard, we assume that Ph and Pl are concave in q. A special case of this heterogeneous
8The assumption that customers care only about the weighted sum of congestion and price, where the
weight differentiates the classes, is made for tractability. We also only consider two classes of customers for
simplicity. We conjecture that in a more general model with more customer classes (or where the customer
utility is a nonlinear function of congestion and price, which may vary across different classes of customers)
our qualitative results continue to hold. This is because with just two categories of service, an SP can
partition customers into at most two classes and offer at most two different prices.
9In other words, Pt(q) gives the maximum delivered price for which q customers of type t would be willing
to purchase service.
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customer model is the homogeneous model in which λh = λl, so there is only one type of
customer. (Alternatively, one of the demand functions can be set to zero.) In this case, we
denote the overall inverse demand as simply P (q).
Pricing Game and Equilibrium
We consider a game in which SPs first simultaneously announce prices on licensed and
unlicensed bands. Customers then choose SPs based on the delivered price. In this section
we characterize the corresponding equilibrium along with the associated social welfare and
consumer surplus.
Let xhi , x
l
i be the number (measure) of customers of each type that receive service from
SP i in the licensed band. Similarly, let xwhi , x
wl
i be the number of customers of each type
served by SP i in the unlicensed band. Thus, xi = x
h
i + x
l
i and x
w
i = x
wh
i + x
wl
i . We
assume each customer is infinitesimally small and adopt the notion of Wardrop equilibrium
to characterize how demand is allocated (Wardrop (1952)). Namely, given a price vector
(p,pw), the non-negative demand vector (xh,xl,xwh,xwl) induced by (p,pw) must satisfy
in the licensed bands:
pi + λtli(xi) = Pt(Qt), if x
t
i > 0, t ∈ {h, l}
pi + λtli(xi) ≥ Pt(Qt), if xti = 0, t ∈ {h, l}
(1)
and in the unlicensed bands:
pwi + λtg(X
w) = Pt(Qt), if x
t
i > 0, t ∈ {h, l}
pwi + λtg(X
w) ≥ Pt(Qt), if xti = 0, t ∈ {h, l}.
(2)
Here, Qt =
∑
i (x
t
i + x
wt
i ) for t ∈ {h, l} is the total number of customers of type t served in
the market.
Remark: It is straightforward to show that given a price vector, the corresponding
demand vector satisfying the above conditions always exists and is the solution to a convex
program. (See, for example, Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2007a) for a proof of a similar result
without the addition of an analogous unlicensed resource.) We next define the equilibrium
notion we will use for the overall game.
Definition 1 A pair (p,pw) and (xh,xl,xwh,xwl) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if
(xh,xl,xwh,xwl) satisfies equation (1) and (2) given (p,pw), and no SP can increase its
revenue by changing its prices.
Social Welfare and Customer Surplus
Next, we define the notions of social welfare and customer surplus in this setting.
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Definition 2 Let (xh,xl,xwh,xwl) be the demand vector induced by some price vector
(p,pw) according to (1) and (2). Then the social welfare is given by
SW =
∫ Qh
0
Ph(q)dq +
∫ Ql
0
Pl(q)dq
−
∑
i∈N
λhx
h
i li(xi)−
∑
i∈N
λlx
l
ili(xi)− λhg(Xw)Xwh − λlg(Xw)Xwl,
(3)
where Xw = Xwh +Xwl, and Xwh and Xwl are the number of high and low customers in the
unlicensed band, respectively, and Qh =
∑
i∈N x
h
i + X
wh and Ql =
∑
i∈N x
l
i + X
wl are the
total number of high and low customers served in the market.
Definition 3 Given price and demand vectors, let ∆h and ∆l be the resulting delivered
price for high and low customers, respectively. Then the customer surplus is given by
CS =
∫ Qh
0
(Ph(q)−∆h)dq +
∫ Ql
0
(Pl(q)−∆l)dq, (4)
where Qh and Ql are defined in Definition 2.
Figure 1: Illustration of pricing game with two SPs, homogeneous customers and unlicensed
spectrum. The quantities x1, x2 and X
w are the amount of customers served by SP1, SP2
and unlicensed spectrum, respectively. The areas of the rectangles pi1, pi2 are the revenues of
SP1 and SP2, respectively. The area of the region between the delivered price and the inverse
demand curve P (q) is the consumer surplus, and the dashed area is total social welfare.
Figure 1 shows an example of the pricing game, where there are two incumbents with
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latency functions l1(·) and l2(·) in their respective licensed bands. The latency function of
the white space is given by g(·). The customer population is homogeneous with the single
inverse demand curve P (q). At an equilibrium in which all bands are used, the Wardrop
conditions imply that the delivered prices across the licensed and unlicensed bands are the
same. That is,
l1(x1) + p1 = l2(x2) + p2 = g(X
w) + pW .
Figure 1 shows that the price charged in the unlicensed band, pW = 0. We will show in the
next section that this is true at any Nash equilibrium. The revenue of SP i is pii = pixi,
i = 1, 2, and corresponds to the area of the indicated rectangle. The social welfare is
the shaded area shown in the figure. The consumer surplus is the shaded area above the
horizontal line at the equilibrium delivered price, and is equal to the social welfare minus
the revenue of all SPs.
3 Main results
We first show that the announced price in equilibrium in the unlicensed band is the marginal
cost, which we assume to be zero. We then use this result to investigate the effect of adding
unlicensed spectrum on the social welfare and consumer surplus.
3.1 Equilibrium Price in Unlicensed Spectrum
Let p∗ and (xh∗,xl∗) denote the equilibrium price and demand vectors in the licensed bands,
respectively, and pw∗ and (xwh∗,xwl∗) denote the corresponding equilibrium prices and de-
mands in the unlicensed band. Let Q∗t be the total number of type t customers served in the
equilibrium. Also recall that g(·) is the congestion cost in the unlicensed band; g(0) > 0 then
represents some fixed cost experienced by all customers in that band, e.g., due to sharing
with other systems and services.
Lemma 1 Given at least two SPs in a market with unlicensed spectrum, at any equilibrium
either pw∗ = 0, with at least two SPs serving a positive mass of customers, or no customers
are served in that band. Furthermore, if no customers are served, then g(0) ≥ Pt(Q∗t ) for
both types of customers.
Remark: This result can be easily extended to a scenario where each SP has a non-zero
marginal cost for providing the unlicensed service. In that case, the equilibrium unlicensed
price will be the marginal cost. The qualitative result is the same, and thus for simplicity, we
assume the marginal costs are zero. (This can be interpreted as having zero-cost devices.)
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This result follows from the assumption that all customers using the unlicensed spectrum
experience the same congestion cost. Hence the SPs with the lowest price capture the entire
market for a given customer class. If there are at least two SPs only serving customers in the
unlicensed band, competition will then drive the prices to zero. However, if SPs competing
in the unlicensed band also offer services in licensed spectrum, then lowering the price for
unlicensed service can lower their revenue in the licensed band. We next show that even in
this case prices will be driven to zero. If no one offers service in the unlicensed band, then
the delivered price in the unlicensed band (g(0)) must exceed that in the licensed bands
(Pt(Q
∗
t )). If the congestion cost in the unlicensed band satisfies g(0) = 0, then that scenario
cannot occur.
Proof: Proof of Lemma 1: Assume that in equilibrium pw∗ 6= 0 and some SP serves a
strictly positive mass of customers. Call an SP active if in equilibrium she sets a positive
price that results in a strictly positive quantity of customers. The Wardrop equilibrium
conditions imply that all active SPs in the unlicensed band must charge the same price,
pw∗ > 0.
Furthermore, in equilibrium if one SP is active in the unlicensed band, then all SPs must
be active in that band. Otherwise, an inactive SP could increase its revenue by charging
the same price in the unlicensed band as the active SP. That would increase the number of
customers it serves without decreasing revenue from the licensed band. Thus, it follows that
in any equilibrium either all SPs are active and charge the same price pw∗ > 0, or no SP
serves a positive mass of customers in the unlicensed band. The latter case contradicts our
assumption, hence we focus on the first case.
Given that all SPs are active and charge the same price in the unlicensed band, consider
the effect of an SP i dropping her price by . It must be that before dropping her price she
is serving xwi < X
w. Since all customers experience the same latency, all Xw customers will
switch to SP i. Furthermore, some customers currently on licensed bands will also switch to
i’s unlicensed service.
It follows that if SP i is an entrant, then she can significantly increase her revenue by
dropping the price by a small amount. However, if SP i is an incumbent, dropping her price
in the unlicensed band by  can decrease her revenue in the licensed spectrum. Nevertheless,
if  is small enough, we next show that SP i still increases its revenue. Let the equilibrium
price in the licensed band of SP i be p∗i , and assume it keeps this price. Suppose that after
dropping the price in the unlicensed band by  the customer mass of SP i in the licensed
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band is reduced by δxi . The overall change in i’s profit pii is given by
δpii ≥ (pw∗ − )Xw∗ − (pw∗xw∗i + δxip∗i )
= pw∗(Xw∗ − xw∗i )− Xw∗ − δxip∗i .
Since lim→0 δxi = 0, there exists a sufficiently small  > 0 such that δpii is strictly positive.
Thus, decreasing the price in the unlicensed band is a profitable deviation for SP i. This
contradicts the initial assumption. Therefore, pw∗i = 0 for every SP i serving customers in
the unlicensed band. Furthermore, for this to be an equilibrium at least two SPs must serve
customers at this price.10
Finally, to prove the last part of the lemma, suppose that no SP is serving customers
in the unlicensed band in equilibrium, but g(0) < Pt(Q
∗
t ). An incumbent SP could then
increase its revenue by offering unlicensed service. Hence, any incumbent SP that deviated
to offer unlicensed service would be the sole provider of unlicensed service. Suppose that such
a provider maximizes its revenue across the licensed and unlicensed bands while keeping the
total number of customers served fixed (so as to not change the delivered price). Inspecting
the optimality conditions of this problem, it can be seen that the incumbent can always
increase its revenue by using both bands, leading to a contradiction.
3.2 Social Welfare
We now analyze how the social welfare varies with the amount of unlicensed spectrum added.
We start with homogeneous consumers and show that for a class of demand and latency
functions, social welfare first decreases and then increases as more unlicensed spectrum is
added. We then show that with heterogeneous customers the total welfare can vary in a
more complicated manner.
3.2.1 Homogeneous model:
Suppose a single incumbent (monopoly) initially operates in a licensed band, and an unli-
censed band becomes available. Both new entrants and the incumbent can then offer service
in the unlicensed band. (The new entrants only use the unlicensed band.) In this section we
focus on the homogeneous model and so without loss of generality we set λl = λh = 1 and
drop the customer type from the notation.
10SPs would be indifferent between announcing a price of zero or an arbitrarily high price for unlicensed
service, since in either case their revenue is zero.
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As in Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2007a), we consider the case where all users have the same
valuation W for service (i.e., users are homogeneous not only in how they weight congestion
and price, but also in how they value the service). This corresponds to the inverse demand
P (x) having constant value W for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and then dropping to zero for x > 1. Customers
choose an SP based on delivered price as long as it is at most W . We focus on the case
where W is such that prior to adding the unlicensed band not all customers are served by the
incumbent. That can occur because the incumbent is a monopolist and so has an incentive to
limit supply to extract a higher price, and also because serving all customers would produce
an excessively high congestion cost.
We will assume that the congestion cost (latency) in each band is linear. That is, the
latency in the licensed band is
l(x) = T1 + bx,
where b > 0 and 0 ≤ T1 ≤ W , and the latency in the unlicensed band is
g(x) = T2 + αCx,
where 0 ≤ T2 ≤ W and C ≥ 0 denotes the unlicensed bandwidth. We assume that αC > 0
is decreasing in C; when C = 0 (no unlicensed spectrum), α0 =∞, and as C →∞, αC → 0.
The offsets T1, T2 can be interpreted as fixed costs for connecting to the SP. We also assume
g(1) > l(0) and l(1) > g(0),
that is, the congestion cost of serving the whole market in one band exceeds the fixed cost
of connecting in the other.
The following theorem describes what happens when the incumbent’s bandwidth, corre-
sponding to the coefficient b of the congestion cost, is fixed and we increase C, the bandwidth
allocated to the unlicensed band.
Theorem 1 Consider an incumbent SP with licensed spectrum that does not serve all of the
demand. If an amount of unlicensed spectrum C is added then:
(i) For every C ≥ 0 there is a unique equilibrium.
(ii) The social welfare at an equilibrium, S(C), exhibits the following behavior. There exist
0 < C1 < C2 ≤ ∞ such that S(0) = S(C1) > S(C2) and
– S(C) = S(0) for 0 ≤ C ≤ C1;
– S(C) is monotone decreasing for C1 ≤ C ≤ C2;
13
Figure 2: Social welfare as a function of the bandwidth of unlicensed spectrum for a single
incumbent and homogeneous users.
– S(C) is monotone increasing for C ≥ C2.
Figure 2 illustrates the behavior of S(C) as specified in this theorem. The formal proof
is given in Appendix A.1. What follows is an informal explanation of this result.
Figure 3: Illustration of adding a relatively small amount of unlicensed spectrum (left) and
a relatively larger amount (right).
Without unlicensed spectrum, it can be seen that the incumbent extracts all of the welfare
with the assumed inverse demand, i.e., the delivered price is W . Furthermore, by assumption,
when C = 0, the incumbent’s price p∗1 is such that the number of customers it serves x
∗
1 < 1.
Figure 3 illustrates the effect of adding a relatively small amount of unlicensed spectrum
(left figure) and a larger value (right figure) to such a market. In the left figure, adding the
unlicensed band enables Xw additional customers to be served, without changing the fraction
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of customers served in the licensed band (x∗1). The congestion cost in the unlicensed band
g(Xw) = W , which is also the delivered price due to Lemma 1, so that the consumer surplus
is zero and the total welfare remains equal to the incumbent’s revenue, i.e., S(C) = p∗1x
∗
1.
Hence, adding the unlicensed spectrum in this scenario affects neither the prices (announced
and delivered) nor the social welfare. This is due to the high congestion cost in the unlicensed
band.
As C increases, the slope of the latency function g(x) decreases until the latency curve
g(x) passes through the corner point of the inverse demand so that g(1 − x∗1) = W and
all customers are served. This corresponds to C = C1. Increasing C further decreases the
delivered price, as shown in the right figure. Better service in the unlicensed band then
attracts customers away from the licensed band so that the consumer welfare increases and
the SP revenue decreases. The incumbent need not respond to this erosion in share with a
price cut. In fact, the incumbent might benefit from a price increase. That would drive even
more customers into the unlicensed band, worsening the service quality there. Customers
that remain in the licensed band pay more, but they receive a higher quality of service
and have no incentive to use the unlicensed band. The number of customers consuming
lower quality service then increases, which increases the overall congestion cost and reduces
social welfare. As C continues to increase, the delivered price continues to fall and consumer
welfare rises until it dominates the loss in SP revenue so that total welfare starts to increase
(at C = C2).
Remark: It is shown in Appendix B.1 that for the class of demand and latency functions
assumed here, adding the unlicensed spectrum can reduce the social welfare by as much as
62%. The same qualitative result is also observed with multiple competing incumbents and
a more general class of demand functions; see Appendix B.2 for a numerical example.
In Appendix A.2 we show that the loss in social welfare as stated in Theorem 4 also
applies to a broader class of latency functions. Specifically, we show that if the latency func-
tions satisfy certain convexity conditions so that the SP revenue is concave in the number of
customers it serves, then there is a range of parameter such that adding unlicensed spectrum
decreases social welfare. An example is when the congestion cost of the unlicensed band
is linear and the congestion cost of the licensed band is increasing convex. A similar argu-
ment applies to this scenario. Namely, when faced with competition from a small amount
of unlicensed spectrum the incumbent will increase its announced price, which induces some
customers to switch from the licensed to unlicensed band increasing congestion and reducing
total welfare.
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3.2.2 Heterogeneous Model:
With two customer types, one might expect that adding unlicensed spectrum increases
efficiency since the market may be able to sort the high/low customers into the propri-
etary/unlicensed bands. We instead show that with heterogeneous customers, the social wel-
fare again does not generally increase monotonically with increasing unlicensed bandwidth,
and exhibits more complicated behavior when compared with the homogeneous model.
We again consider the scenario in which an unlicensed band is added to a licensed band
used by a single incumbent (monopolist). The incumbent, as well as new entrants, can then
offer services in the unlicensed band. As in Section 3.2.1, all customers of the same type t
have a common valuation Wt for service, but now we allow two different valuations for the
two classes. That is, the inverse demand Pt(q) for each type t is a constant Wt for 0 ≤ q ≤ Qt
and then drops to zero for q ≥ Qt, where Qt is the total mass of type t customers. The
SP then serves customers provided that its delivered price is at most Wt. We also assume
Wh > Wl and Qh < Ql, i.e., the high-type customers have higher valuations for the service
and there are more low- than high-type customers.
Figure 4: Example of social welfare as a function of the unlicensed bandwidth for the het-
erogeneous model.
Figure 4 shows an example of social welfare versus unlicensed bandwidth C for the
heterogeneous model. The example is described in Appendix B.3. Namely, when 0 ≤ C ≤ C2
the incumbent serves both types of consumers and the shape of the curve is similar to that
for the homogeneous model. When C = C2 there is a sudden drop in the social welfare. At
this threshold, the incumbent increases the price discontinuously in an attempt to serve only
high-type customers. This causes all low-type customers to switch to the unlicensed band.
When C increases from C2 to C3, congestion in the unlicensed spectrum decreases, which
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increases the total social welfare. When C > C3, the unlicensed band starts to compete
with the licensed band again and we get a similar effect as in the homogeneous model: social
welfare decreases until C = C4, and then starts to increase again.
The sudden increase in the price at C = C2 and drop in the social welfare will be
analyzed in the next section. Since the unlicensed band competes with the licensed band,
adding unlicensed spectrum can only decrease the revenue of the monopolist. We will see
that the drop in social welfare at C = C2 is caused by a decrease in consumer surplus as well
as the monopolist’s revenue.
3.3 Consumer Surplus
In this section we analyze the change in customer surplus when unlicensed spectrum is added
to an existing market for wireless services offered in licensed spectrum. We show that when
customers are homogeneous, adding unlicensed spectrum can never increase the delivered
price, so that consumer surplus cannot decrease. However, an important difference emerges
with the heterogeneous model: adding unlicensed spectrum induces the SP to serve only
high-type customers. Specifically, suppose that the incumbent SP serves both high- and
low-type customers with no unlicensed band. If a sufficiently small amount of unlicensed
spectrum is added, then the incumbent will continue to serve both classes of customers.
However, as the unlicensed bandwidth increases, the incumbent will raise the price to serve
only high-type customers causing a drop in customer surplus. We show that this effect is
always present in heterogeneous models for general (concave, non-increasing) demand curves
and (convex, increasing) latency functions.
Our results are stated in the next two theorems. The first pertains to the homogeneous
model.
Theorem 2 Consider a single SP with licensed spectrum and a set of homogeneous cus-
tomers, i.e. λl = λh. Let ∆0 and ∆1 be the delivered equilibrium prices before and after the
unlicensed spectrum is introduced, respectively. Then ∆0 ≥ ∆1.
Proof: The proof is by contradiction. We assume homogeneous customers, a single in-
cumbent, and general demand and congestion functions. Let ∆ be the delivered price, and
let a be the corresponding number of customers in the unlicensed band and x and p be
the corresponding number of customers and price of the licensed band, respectively. (See
Figure 5.)
We will consider the following three cases: (i) There is no unlicensed spectrum and
the incumbent maximizes its revenue. For this case, let ∆0 be the delivered price, so that
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Figure 5: Illustration of the revenue differences in the proof of Theorem 2.
a0 = 0 and ∆0 = l(x0) + p0. (ii) A fixed amount of unlicensed spectrum is introduced and
the provider charges a price to maximize revenue under competition with the unlicensed
spectrum. For this case we denote the parameters by ∆1, p1, x1 and a1. (iii) The provider
charges a price p2 such that the delivered price is ∆2 = ∆0 accounting for the competition
with the unlicensed band. For this case, x2 and a2 are the number of customers in the
licensed and unlicensed bands, respectively.
We assume that ∆1 > ∆0 = ∆2 and will show that this implies p2x2 > p1x1. This is a
contradiction because the provider is assumed to maximize its revenue at p1. First observe
that because ∆1 > ∆2, g(a1) = ∆1, and g(a2) = ∆2, it must be that a2 < a1. Since ∆1 > ∆0,
the inverse demand curve at x0 cannot be flat, and so x2 + a2 = x0.
Next, consider the function
R(x) = (∆2 − l(x))x = (∆0 − l(x))x,
which is the incumbent’s revenue when the delivered price is fixed at ∆2 = ∆0 as a function
x. Because l(x) is a convex function, R(x) is strictly concave. In case (i) (no unlicensed spec-
trum) the provider achieves the maximum revenue R(x0). Therefore, R(x) is an increasing
function from 0 to x0. Thus, since x2 ≤ x0, it must be that
R(x2) > R(x2 + a2 − a1) =: R(x3),
where x3 = x2 + a2 − a1 < x2. Thus, x3 + a1 = x2 + a2. Now, because ∆2 = ∆0 < ∆1, we
have
x2 + a2 > x1 + a1.
Furthermore, because x3 + a1 = x2 + a2 > x1 + a1, we have x3 > x1.
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Consider the difference
R(x3)−R(x0) = R(x3)−R(x3 + a1).
As seen on the left-hand side of Fig. 5, this is the difference between the areas A and B,
which is
R(x3)−R(x0) = x3(l(x3 + a1)− l(x3))− a1(∆0 − l(x3 + a1)). (5)
Similarly, considering the difference R(x1)−R(x1 + a1) (given by the difference between
the areas of A′ and B′ on the right side of Figure 5), we have
p1x1 − (∆1 − l(x1 + a1))(x1 + a1)
= x1(l(x1 + a1)− l(x1))− a1(∆1 − l(x1 + a1)).
(6)
Now since x3 > x1 and l(x) is convex, we obtain
x3(l(x3 + a1)− l(x3)) > x1(l(x1 + a1)− l(x1)).
Furthermore, ∆0 < ∆1 and x3 + a1 > x1 + a1 implies
a1(∆0 − l(x3 + a1)) < a1(∆1 − l(x1 + a1)).
Thus, the quantity in (6) must lower bound that in (5), giving
R(x3)−R(x0) > p1x1 − (∆1 − l(x1 + a1))(x1 + a1).
Moreover, (∆1 − l(x1 + a1))(x1 + a1) corresponds to the revenue the provider would achieve
without the unlicensed band if it charges the price ∆1 − l(x1 + a1). Thus, R(x0) > (∆1 −
l(x1 + a1))(x1 + a1). Therefore,
R(x3) > p1x1,
which is the desired contradiction to the fact that the provider optimizes its revenue.
The next theorem states the drop in customer surplus with heterogeneous users.
Theorem 3 Consider the heterogeneous model with a single incumbent and Ph(0) ≥ λhl(0).
Suppose that without unlicensed spectrum both customer types are served at equilibrium. Then
there exists a C0 > 0 such that when the bandwidth of unlicensed is increased from C
−
0 to C
+
0 ,
the incumbent increases her price discontinuously to serve high-type customers exclusively,
which causes a drop in customer surplus.
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Proof: See Appendix A.3.
Note that adding more unlicensed spectrum increases competition, which decreases the
revenue of the monopolist SP. Thus, this result shows that introducing additional spectrum
as unlicensed band leads to a decrease in both the monopolist’s revenue and consumer surplus.
In Appendix B.3 we provide some numerical examples to illustrate how the consumer
welfare depends on the unlicensed bandwidth. We show that there exists a range of param-
eters such that when C+0 bandwidth of unlicensed spectrum is introduced, customer surplus
is strictly smaller than with only licensed spectrum. We next explain the intuition behind
Theorem 3.
Consider the model without unlicensed spectrum. The provider charges a price p and by
assumption serves both types of customers, i.e., all high-type customers and a fraction of
the low-type customers. Let R be the corresponding maximum total revenue. The provider
could alternatively charge a higher price pH such that only high-type customers use the
service. Let the resulting revenue under pH be RH , where RH < R.
Now suppose an amount C of unlicensed spectrum is introduced, which competes with
the provider. As a result, the incumbent’s maximized revenue RC decreases in C. When C
is small the provider will also change the price p by a small amount so that at this price
both type of users are still served. When C is large enough, however, the provider has an
incentive to suddenly increase the price and in many cases could raise p up to pH to eliminate
low-type customers and still obtain revenue RH from the high-type customers. When such a
price increase occurs, the high-type customers pay a higher price and their surplus decreases.
On the other hand, the low-type customers need to use the unlicensed band, which will be
highly congested. As a result, their surplus decreases as well.
4 Conclusions
We have studied a model for adding unlicensed spectrum to a market for wireless services
in which incumbents have licensed spectrum. Our analysis has shown that there is a range
of scenarios in which adding unlicensed spectrum reduces overall welfare. Specifically, this
occurs when the additional unlicensed bandwidth is relatively small, so that it is readily
congested. In contrast, examples have shown that this decrease does not occur when the
additional bandwidth is assigned to a new or incumbent SP as licensed. We emphasize that
a key property of the unlicensed spectrum in our model is that the congestion increases
with the total traffic offloaded by all SPs, which may be expected at low frequencies (TV
bands). Hence our results indicate that the success of applications in unlicensed bands at
high frequencies may not translate to similar success at lower frequencies.
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From a policy point-of-view these results indicate that if spectrum is abundant, then
adding unlicensed spectrum should not lower welfare. Hence in settings such as rural areas
where demand is naturally limited, the type of congestion effects we consider may not be a
significant issue. However, when spectrum is scarce, introducing relatively small amounts of
white space might actually reduce welfare. Thus, in areas where demand is high, policies to
limit congestion should be considered, such as establishing a market for a limited number of
device permits as in Peha (2009).
These conclusions assume that the unlicensed spectrum offers services that compete with
the services provided in the licensed bands. While that may create the most social welfare
in some scenarios, in other scenarios the unlicensed spectrum might be used to provide other
types of services (e.g., within a local area). Indeed proponents of unlicensed spectrum have
argued that open access fosters innovation in technology and business models that may lead
to unforeseen uses of this spectrum (Milgrom et al. (2011)). That possibility must then
be weighed against the potential for innovation in licensed allocations in addition to the
congestion effects considered here.
A Missing Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
In this proof we consider the incumbent as SP 1. Before the unlicensed band is introduced,
let p∗1 be the price charged by the incumbent and x
∗
1 < 1 the mass of customers served.
After opening the unlicensed band with bandwidth C, let x1 and X
w be the number of
customers using the licensed and unlicensed band respectively. Let p1 be the price charged
in the licensed band and P be the new delivered price. (See Figure 3).
Let C1 be the value such that the corresponding congestion cost for 1− x∗1 customers is
equal to W . That is
g(1− x∗1) = T2 + αC1(1− x∗1) = W. (7)
Proof of (i)
When C ≤ C1, it is straightforward to see that the unique equilibrium must be given by
p = p∗1, x1 = x
∗
1, X
w = g−1(W ), i.e., the unlicensed band does not affect the price charged by
the incumbent or the number of users it serves, and the overall welfare is constant.
Next we establish uniqueness of the equilibrium and its structure for C > C1. First we
prove that when C > C1, at any equilibrium, all the customers will be served. To see this,
21
assume that x1 +X
w < 1. We then know that the delivered price must be W , and so
g(Xw) = T2 + αCX
w = W.
Because C > C1 we have X
w > 1− x∗1. This shows that x1 < 1−Xw < x∗1. Therefore,
p1 = W − l(x1) > W − l(x∗1) = p∗1.
The incumbent, however, can charge a lower price to attract customers, who are currently
unserved. Moreover, total revenue is a concave function 11, and it is maximized at p∗1. Thus
by lowering p1, which is greater than p
∗
1, the incumbent can gain more revenue. This leads
to a contradiction.
We now show that there is a unique equilibrium. Assuming C > C1, it follows that at
any equilibrium (p1, x1, X
w) must satisfy:
x1 +X
w = 1
l(x1) + p1 = T1 + bx1 + p1 = P ≤ W (8)
g(Xw) = T2 + αCX
w = P ≤ W.
From this one can derive a revenue maximization problem for the incumbent. Given p1,
x1(p1) satisfying the above equations is a linear function of p1. Thus, pi1(p1) = p1x1(p1) is a
quadratic function of p1 and therefore the incumbent’s problem is
max
p1
pi1(p1) subject to p1 + T1 + bx1(p1) ≤ W. (9)
This problem always has an unique solution showing the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Proof of (ii)
In the remainder of the proof we derive the behavior of S(C). Observe that in optimization
problem (9), depending on the parameters T1, T2, b,W,C, the solution must either be an
interior point so that pi′1(p1) = 0 or a boundary point satisfying p1 + T1 + bx1(p1) = W .
Now consider the solution of the unconstrained problem pi′1(p1) = 0. From (8), we have
(b+ αC)x1 + p1 = (T2 − T1) + αC .
11One can visualize the revenue of the incumbent p∗1x
∗
1 as the area of the dashed rectangle on the left
picture of Figure 3, where its lower-right corner runs on the line l(x). It is straightforward to see that the
revenue function is a concave function.
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Thus pi′1(p1) = (p1 · x1(p1))′ = 0 gives
p1(C) =
(T2 − T1) + αC
2
;x1(C) =
(T2 − T1) + αC
2(b+ αC)
. (10)
Because l(1) > g(0), we have T2 − T1 < b, which shows that
x1 =
(T2 − T1) + αC
2(b+ αC)
is increasing in αC . Therefore, p1 + l(x1) is increasing in αC . However, αC is a decreasing
function of C, thus p1(C) + l(x1(C)) is decreasing in C. Furthermore, it is straightforward
to see that when C →∞,
p1(∞) + l(x1(∞)) = (T2 − T1)
2
+ T1 + b
(T2 − T1)
2b
= T2 < W,
and when C → 0 p1(C) tends to infinity because α0 =∞. Therefore, there exists an unique
C∗ such that p1(C∗) + l(x1(C∗)) = W .
Now, if C∗ ≤ C1, then we define C2 = ∞, otherwise we define C2 = C∗. In both cases
because p1(C) + l(x1(C)) decreases in C, we have for all C ∈ [C1, C2]
p1(C) + l(x1(C)) > p1(C2) + l(x1(C2)) = W.
Therefore the unique equilibrium determined by (9) needs to satisfy the condition that the
delivered price is W .
Now, when the delivered price is W , observe that
g(Xw) = W ⇒ Xw = C(W − T2).
Thus Xw increases in C and x1 = 1 − Xw decreases in C and by the same amount as
Xw increases. However, l(x1) < W , which means that when C increases the total mass of
customers does not increase but some customers switch from a service with congestion cost
l(x1) to a worse one (congestion cost of W ) and thus the congestion cost increases and social
welfare decreases.
Last, we consider the case C > C2. We know that when C > C2, the unique Nash
equilibrium will satisfy pi′1(p1) = 0 and we can use (10). In this case we know that the
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delivered price is p1 + l(x1) < W , and all customers are served. Therefore, social welfare is
S(C) = p1x1 + (W − p1 − l(x1)), here l(x1) = T1 + bx1.
One can take the derivative of S(C) with respect to C. Here, we simplify the formulation
by a change of variables. Namely, let z = b + αC and a = b + T1 − T2 > 0. We have
z′(C) = α′(C) < 0 and
p1(C) =
z − a
2
;x1(C) =
z − a
2z
.
A simple calculation yields
S ′(C) = z′(C)S ′(z) = −α′(C)
(
1
4
+
ab
2z2
+
a2
4z2
)
.
From this we see that S ′(C) > 0, therefore S(C) is an increasing function. This concludes
the proof.
A.2 Extension of Theorem 1
Consider an environment with the boxed demand with consumer valuation W as in The-
orem 1, assume an incumbent SP with licensed spectrum that does not serve all of the
demand. We assume g(C, x) and l(x) are strictly increasing and convex in x. Moreover,
g(C, x) is continuously differentiable and strictly decreasing in C and limC→0 g(C, x) = ∞;
limC→∞ g(C, x) < W . Furthermore, to avoid a trivia scenario in which no consumers have
incentive to use one of the two services, we also assume g(C, 0) < W and l(0) < W . We
have the following result.
Theorem 4 If x · (g(C, 1− x)− l(x)) is concave in x, and the incumbent SP with licensed
spectrum that does not serve all of the demand, then
(i) For every C ≥ 0 there is a unique equilibrium.
(ii) There exists C1 < C2 such that as the amount of unlicensed spectrum C increases from
C1 to C2, the incumbent SP increases the price and social welfare decreases.
Proof:
First notice that when g(C, x) is increasing and linear in x, and l(x) is an increasing convex
function x · (g(C, 1− x)− l(x)) is concave and thus, the result in Theorem 4 holds.
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The proof of Theorem 4 is similar to that of Theorem 1. Namely, before the unlicensed
band is introduced, let p∗ be the price charged by the incumbent and x∗ < 1 the mass of
customers served. We have
x∗ = argmaxx x · (W − l(x)).
Taking the derivative we obtain x∗(0− l′(x∗)) + (W − l(x∗)) = 0. This implies
W = l(x∗) + x∗ · l′(x∗) (11)
Let C1 be the value such that the congestion cost in the unlicensed band for 1−x∗ customers
is equal to W . That is
g(C1, 1− x∗) = W. (12)
Because of our assumption that limC→0 g(C, x) = ∞; limC→∞ g(C, x) < W and g(C, x) is
continuous in C, such C1 exists.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, when C > C1 in a Nash equilibrium all customers are
served in either the unlicensed or the licensed wireless service. Therefore, x1 and X
w are in
an equilibrium if and only if.
x1 +X
w = 1 (13)
l(x1) + p1 = g(C,X
w) = P ≤ W (14)
The revenue of the incumbent SP (SP1) can be written as
Rev(x1) = x1 · p1 = x1 · (g(C, 1− x1)− l(x1)).
Analogous to the proof of Theorem 1, because of the assumption that Rev(x1) is concave in
x1, there is an unique equilibrium. Furthermore, let
xC = argmaxx x · (g(C, 1− x)− l(x))
If g(C, 1 − xC) ≤ W , then at the equilibrium, number of consumer served by SP1 is xC . If
on the other hand, g(C, 1− xC) > W , then at the equilibrium xC cannot be at equilibrium
because (14) is violated. In this case at the equilibrium, the delivered price is W .
Now, consider
xC1 = argmaxx x · (g(C1, 1− x)− l(x)).
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Taking the derivatives, we have
xC1(−g′(C1, 1− xC1)− l′(xC1)) + (g(C1, 1− xC1)− l(xC1)) = 0.
This is equivalent to
−g′(C1, 1− xC1) · xC1 + g(C1, 1− xC1) = l(xC1) + xC1 · l′(xC1).
Replacing g(C1, 1− xC1) = W we get
W = l(xC1) + xC1 · l′(xC1) + g′(C1, 1− xC1) · xC1 (15)
Because g′(C1, 1− xC1) · xC1 > 0, thus, from (11) and (15) we have
l(xC1) + xC1 · l′(xC1) < l(x∗) + x∗ · l′(x∗)
which implies xC1 < x
∗ because l(x) is increasing and convex. Therefore
g(C1, 1− xC1) > g(C1, 1− x∗) = W.
Notice that because x·(g(C, 1−x)−l(x)) is strictly concave and g is continuously differentiable
C, xC = argmaxx·(g(C, 1−x)−l(x)) is continuous in C. Hence, g(C, 1−xC) is also continuous
in C. Thus, there exists C2 > C1 such that
for every C1 < C < C2 : g(C, 1− xC) > W.
According to the argument above, for all C1 < C < C2, at the equilibrium, the delivered
price is W .
Now, let x∗C be the number of consumer at the equilibrium, we have g(C, 1 − x∗C) = W
for C1 < C < C2. Because g(C, y) decreases in C, x
∗
C also decreases as C increases from C1
to C2. This means that as C increases from C1 to C2 SP will increase the price. As a result
social welfare decreases. This is what we need to prove.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
We first show that when the unlicensed spectrum bandwidth is large enough, the optimal
revenue is obtained when the SP only serves high-type customers. Thus, because of the
assumption that the SP serves a mixture of the two types in equilibrium before the unlicensed
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spectrum is introduced, there must be a bandwidth of unlicensed spectrum, C0, at which
the SP switches from serving both types to only the high type.
Given δ > 0 let xδ be the optimal point of
Rδ = max
x
{x · (δ − l(x))}. (16)
Rδ is the shaded area in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Improving revenue by targeting only high typed customers
Note that xδ is unique because l(x) is convex. Furthermore, xδ is a continuous function
of δ. When δ = l(0), xδ = 0 and there exists δ large enough such that Ph(xδ) < λhδ. Note
that because Ph(x) is decreasing, l(x) is increasing and λhl(0) < Ph(0), one can see that
there exists δ∗ such that
Ph(xδ∗) = λhδ
∗.
Now consider a situation where there is only unlicensed spectrum and there are only low
type customers. Let Cδ∗ be a value such that if the bandwidth of unlicensed spectrum is Cδ∗ ,
then the the congestion cost of the unlicensed band is δ∗. We will show that in the setting
with the incumbent SP when C = Cδ∗ the optimal revenue of the incumbent is obtained by
serving high type customers only.
To see this, observe that when serving both types of customers, the delivered price for
low type customers cannot be higher than λlδ
∗. This is true because we know that when
serving both types of customers, the users in the unlicensed spectrum are of the low type
and because we have Cδ∗ bandwidth of unlicensed spectrum, the congestion in the unlicensed
band is at most δ∗. Therefore, the optimal revenue that the incumbent SP can obtain while
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serving both types can be at most
max
x
{x · λl(δ∗ − l(x))} = λlRδ∗ ,
where Rδ∗ is defined in (16).
However, if the SP charges the price p = λh(δ
∗− l(xδ∗)), then the equilibrium of the game
is the following: no low type customers use the licensed spectrum and xδ∗ high customers
use the service in the licensed band. This is true because the congestion of the unlicensed
band is g(x) = δ∗, the delivered price for low type customers in the licensed band is
λll(xδ∗) + λh(δ
∗ − l(xδ∗)) > λll(xδ∗) + λl(δ∗ − l(xδ∗)) = λlδ∗.
Thus, no low type customers would choose to use the licensed band. On the other hand the
delivered price for high type customers is λlδ
∗ = Ph(xδ∗). Therefore no high type customers
would use the unlicensed band either.
Now, in this case, the SP’s revenue is
p · xδ∗ = λhRδ∗ > λlRδ∗ .
This shows that when C = Cδ∗ the incumbent SP only serves high type customers.
Therefore, there exists a 0 < C0 < Cδ∗ such that if the unlicensed bandwidth is increased
from C−0 to C
+
0 , the incumbent has an incentive to switch the class of customers and target
only the high class.
Consider such a transition. When C = C+0 the unlicensed band is open to all low
type customers and they do not have other choices. Thus the delivered price for low type
customers must be non-decreasing compared with when C = C−0 . Let xh, xl be the number
of customers of high and low types in the licensed band and Xw be the number of customer
in the unlicensed band at C = C−0 . We have
λll(xh + xl) + p = λlg(W
w).
Thus, the delivered price for the high type customers at that time is
λhl(xh + xl) + p <
λh
λl
(λll(xh + xl) + p) = λhg(W
w).
This means that high type customers strictly prefer the licensed band to the unlicensed one.
Now, at C = C+0 the quality of the unlicensed band has worsened. Therefore, the
incumbent also has an incentive to raise the delivered price for high type customers. This
28
shows that the delivered price for low type customers is non-decreasing and the delivered
price for high type customers increases discontinuously. This concludes the proof.
B Numerical Examples
B.1 An example of social welfare loss
Consider the case where T1 = T2 = 0, that is l(x) = x, g(x) =
x
C
. That is αC =
1
C
. We will
calculate C1, C2, S(0) = S(C1) and S(C2) as functions of W .
First we know that at the optimal monopoly price p∗1, we have
W − l(0) = 2p∗1 and W = x∗1 + p∗1
Thus x∗1 = p
∗
1 = W/2, and according to (7), we have
C1 =
1−W/2
W
.
Note that because we assume that before unlicensed spectrum is introduced, the incumbent
did not serve all customer, this can only happen when W < 2. Now,
S(0) = S(C1) =
W 2
4
.
Next to calculate C2 , we have
p1(C2) + l(x1(C2)) =
1
2C2
+
1
2(C2 + 1)
= W,
which implies
C2 =
√
W 2 + 1 + 1−W
2W
> C1.
Thus,
S(C2) =
W 2
2(
√
W 2 + 1 + 1)
.
For example if we consider W = 1, then before unlicensed spectrum is introduced, only
half of the demand is met by a licensed spectrum with bandwidth 1. Adding C2 =
√
2/2 ∼ 0.7
capacity of unlicensed spectrum will create a new service that can serve all the demand.
However, because of the congestion cost, the efficiency goes down to S(C2)
S(C1)
∼ 82.8%.
The worst example is when W = 2 then if C2 =
√
5−1
4
bandwidth of unlicensed spectrum
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is open then the efficiency can go down to S(C2)
S(C1)
∼ 62%.
B.2 A numerical example with multiple, symmetric incumbents
We now give an example to show that the conclusions from Theorem 1 apply in more general
settings. Specifically, we consider a scenario in which there is more than one incumbent SP.
Additionally, we consider a linear inverse demand given by P (q) = 1−βq, where β represents
the elasticity of demand. Each SP has the same congestion cost in her licensed spectrum,
with li(x) = l(x) = x for all i ∈ N . The congestion cost in the unlicensed band is given by
g(x) = x
C
.
For such a model there is a unique symmetric equilibrium. One can actually explicitly
write down the social welfare with there are N SPs either with or without an additional band
of unlicensed spectrum. Here, we provide a numerical example showing the social welfare
decreases when additional capacity is added, i.e., Braess’s paradox occurs. This example is
shown in Fig. 7, where the solid curve is the welfare with additional unlicensed spectrum as
a function of the amount of additional spectrum.
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Figure 7: The social welfare in different scenarios as a function of additional capacity C in
a symmetric linear network with N = 2 and β = 4.
We can also determine the social welfare for a scenario where instead of making the C
units of capacity freely available, we divide this capacity evenly among the existing N SPs.
We model this by again assuming that l(x) is given by the customer mass per unit capacity
for each licensed band, where initially the capacity is normalized to one. Hence, after giving
each SP C/N additional units of capacity, the new congestion function is l˜(x) = 1
1+C/N
x.
This quantity is also shown in Fig. 7. In this case dividing up the spectrum in this manner
improves the welfare for all values of C. This suggests that in cases where Braess’s paradox
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occurs, licensing the spectrum to existing SPs can be socially more efficient.
B.3 Numerical results for the heterogeneous model
We now show a numerical example illustrating the social welfare in a heterogeneous model.
The specific numerical values are the following. Let Wh = 1.6, Qh = 1, Wl = 0.85 and
Ql = 1.3, λh = 0.4 and λl = 0.1. Set l(x) = x and g(x) = x/C. Without unlicensed
band, it can be shown that the incumbent SP would set price p0 = 0.62 to serve all of low
class customers to maximize her revenue. The numerical results of social welfare, customer
surplus and incumbent’s price and revenue are plotted against the unlicensed band capacity
C in Fig. 8.
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Figure 8: An example where the incumbent served both classes initially
In this numerical example, we found the social welfare, as a function of the capacity C
in the unlicensed band, is not monotone. As shown in Fig. 8, there are two regions of C,
[0, C2] and [C3, C4] where social welfare decreases. Note that C
′
2 > C2 for the parameters in
this example, so we define C ′2 := C2.
Comparing social welfare and incumbent’s price in Fig. 8, we find that the two regions
where social welfare decreases are also where the incumbent’s price rises. This phenomenon
is reminiscent to that in the model with homogeneous customers and can be explained in a
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similar way. Namely, the incumbent may benefit from raising her price since this may reduce
the congestion in her licensed band and worsen the quality of service in the unlicensed band.
In particular, there are three stages as C increases. Facing the competition from the
service in the unlicensed band as C increases, the incumbent will eventually “retreat” from
serving low class and suddenly increases its price to serve high class customers only to gain
higher revenue. This corresponds to the jump in the monopoly’s price and the drop in social
welfare and customer surplus in Fig. 8 at C2.
The first stage corresponds to C ∈ [0, C2]. In this stage, the service in the unlicensed
band and that of the incumbent’s licensed band will be competing on low class customers
while the incumbent still serves all of the high class customers. Here we have the same
observation that social welfare decreases as a result of the rise of the monopoly’s price and
congestion in the unlicensed band.
The second stage is when C ∈ [C2, C3]. This is the stage in which the market is sorted.
Namely, the unlicensed band serves only low class and licensed band serves high class cus-
tomers. Thus increasing capacity C has no impact on high class customers but improving
the congestion in the unlicensed band. Therefore, the social welfare is constant or increasing
in this stage.
Finally, when C ∈ [C3,∞], the unlicensed band and licensed band will be competing on
the high class customers while all of the low customers are being served in the unlicensed
band. Similarly, the observation is that the social welfare decreases first as the increase of
the monopoly’s price until C reaches C4 and then eventually starts to increase as the quality
of service in the unlicensed band improves.
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